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PREVIEW; State v. Peoples: Unreasonable Supervision and The
Constitutional Limits of a Probation Search
Alex Butler*
The Montana Supreme Court is set to hear oral argument on this
matter Wednesday, July 7, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of the
Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, Helena,
Montana. Kathryn Hutchison is likely to appear on behalf of Appellant
Arthur Ray Peoples (“Peoples”) and C. Mark Fowler is likely to appear on
behalf of Appellee Montana (“State”).
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents a question about the nature of the State’s
intrusion during a probation search. Specifically, the Court will decide
whether Missoula Probation and Parole’s probation search was a
constitutionally reasonable warrantless intrusion. This case presents the
opportunity for the Court to determine the limits of a warrantless probation
search and the scope of a probationer’s privacy interest during a search.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2003, Arthur Ray Peoples was convicted of operation of an
unlawful clandestine laboratory and criminal possession of dangerous
drugs.1 The district court sentenced Peoples to the maximum sentence of
twenty years imprisonment for the clandestine laboratory offense, with
five years suspended, plus a concurrent five-year sentence for the
possession of dangerous drugs offense.2 In August 2008, Peoples was
paroled from his custodial sentence to Probation and Parole.3 In September
2017, he transitioned to probation after his prison term expired to serve the
remaining suspended time.4
Probation Officer (“P.O.”) Sam Stricker supervised Peoples while
on parole and probation.5 Peoples admitted to methamphetamine use on
multiple occasions which required interventions by P.O. Stricker.6 During
an October 2017 meeting, Peoples admitted to relapse and was referred to,
and successfully completed, the Enhanced Supervision Program (“ESP”).7
*
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Peoples voluntarily complied with multiple home visits.8 The most recent
occurring in February 2018.9
On March 15, 2018, Lisa Peoples, Peoples’ wife,10 called P.O.
Stricker and told him that she believed Peoples was using drugs and that
he might have overdosed.11 Ms. Peoples also stated that she had seen blood
in his apartment.12 Ms. Peoples had called P.O. Stricker in the past to
report Peoples’ drug use, and her reports had often been true.13 After this
call, P.O. Stricker did not call Peoples to check in on him or to make a
request for a home visit.14
On March 16, 2018, P.O. Stricker elicited additional support from
two other probation officers and an agent from the U.S. Marshal’s service
to conduct the probation search.15 Probation and Parole gained forced
entry permission and requested a U.S. Marshal’s assistance because they
are trained for forced entries.16
Later that day, P.O. Stricker and his team arrived at Peoples’
residence, knocked on his front door, and announced their presence.17
Peoples did not answer the knock at the door.18 Then, P.O. Stricker
requested a key to Peoples’ apartment from Peoples’ landlord.19 Peoples’
landlord provided a spare key to P.O. Stricker.20 P.O. Stricker and his team
unlocked the front door with the key and entered the residence with guns
drawn.21 Officers found Peoples sitting on his bed, naked.22 They
handcuffed him to his bed and holstered their guns.23 Officers discovered
drug paraphernalia and a white crystalline substance later proved to be
methamphetamine on his bed stand.24
The State petitioned to revoke Peoples’ suspended sentence due
to alleged compliance violations for failing to answer his door, using
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drugs, and violating the law through possession of methamphetamine.25
The district court denied Peoples’ motion to suppress and held that the
incident was not a home visit, but a probation search, and the nature of the
State’s intrusion was reasonable because the search was supported by
reasonable suspicion.26 The district court found Peoples in violation of all
three Counts and revoked his suspended sentence.27 The district court
sentenced Peoples to the Department of Corrections for four years and
three months, with credit for time served.28 This appeal follows Peoples’
sentencing.29
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant Arthur Ray Peoples

Peoples primarily argues that the State’s probation search violated
his right to privacy and to be free from unreasonable searches under the
Montana Constitution.30 He contends that the nature of the State’s
intrusion into his home was “outrageously disproportionate” to the
suspicion of drug use which initially justified the search.31 Specifically,
Peoples claims that a “team of government agents coerced [his] landlord,
forced entry into his home, brandished semi-automatic pistols, shackled
him naked, and left him on the floor that way for thirty minutes.”32 Peoples
relies on33 both Article II, Section 10’s heightened privacy interests34 and
Section 11’s reasonableness clause.35
First, Peoples argues that his past supervisory relationship with
P.O. Stricker was cooperative and did not justify the degree of force used
during the probation search.36 Peoples asserts that he reported regularly,
admitted to relapses, successfully completed ESP, never refused consent
to home visits, and “did not deny his addiction, nor resist [P.O.] Stricker’s
intervention[s].”37 He further contends that even though his probation
conditions have diminished his expectation of privacy, they do not justify
this type of intrusion into his home.38
25
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Second, Peoples argues that Probation and Parole’s intrusion
exceeded the nature and scope of a reasonable probation search.39 He
contends that the search of his home was both harassing and intimidating
because the intrusion was disproportionate to the report of drug use.40
Peoples asserts that while he did not answer the door when officers
knocked and announced their presence, they still planned in advance to
carry out a forcible entry with multiple officers.41
Peoples concludes that the search was a disproportionate intrusion
into his home, and even though his expectation of privacy was diminished,
the degree of intrusion was not justified.42 Peoples asks the Court to
reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and remand for
further proceedings.43

B. Appellee State of Montana
The State argues that the probation search was conducted in a
constitutionally permissible manner.44 First, the State argues the probation
search was supported by reasonable suspicion.45 The State relies on a
phone call from Ms. Peoples the day before the probation search where
she indicated that Peoples was using meth, may have overdosed, and that
there was “lots of blood” in Peoples’ residence.46 The State maintains that,
given the above information, P.O. Stricker had reasonable suspicion to
conduct a search and that forced entry was required.47
Second, the State argues that the probation search was reasonable
and did not exceed its scope.48 The State contends that, given P.O.
Stricker’s experience and relationship with Peoples, he was in the best
position to determine whether entry was necessary to investigate a
potential violation to support Peoples’ rehabilitative efforts and to protect
society.49 The State asserts that a probationer expects to be “intensively”
supervised, and given Peoples’ history of addiction and “law-breaking,”
P.O. Stricker acted reasonably when he entered Peoples’ home after no
one answered the door.50
39
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Third, the State argues that Peoples’ Opening Brief contains
“factual inaccuracies and exaggerations” which does not comport with the
record.51 The State asserts that officers did not coerce Peoples’ landlord,
the intrusion was not violent when guns were “temporarily unholstered,”
and Peoples was naked because he could have put clothes on and answered
the door when officers knocked and announced.52
The State concludes that the probation search was supported by
reasonable suspicion, and it did not exceed its scope. The State asks the
Court to affirm the district court’s denial of Peoples’ motion to suppress.53
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Court’s standard of review of a district court’s denial of a
motion to suppress will likely be whether the court’s findings of fact are
clearly erroneous and whether the court’s interpretation and application of
the law is correct.54 First, the Court will need to determine whether
reasonable suspicion justified the probation search. The Court will likely
find that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a probation search
of Peoples’ residence. Second, the Court will need to determine whether
the nature of the State’s intrusion was constitutionally reasonable. The
Court will likely hold that the search was unconstitutional because P.O.
Stricker’s request was not reasonable, and the search was harassing and
intimidating. Therefore, the Court will likely reverse the denial of Peoples’
motion to suppress evidence.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution protect citizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures.55 Further, Article II, Section 10 of the
Montana Constitution provides that the right of individual privacy shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.56
Montana’s unique constitution affords citizens a “greater right to privacy”
and broader protection than the Fourth Amendment.57 To determine
whether there has been an unlawful government intrusion into one’s
privacy, the Court will analyze the following factors: (1) whether the
person has an actual expectation of privacy; (2) whether society is willing
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to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable; and (3) the nature
of the State’s intrusion.58
Long jurisprudence defines the rights of person on probation. A
probationary sentence is a form of contract between the court and the
probationer, “eliminating certain privacy expectations.”59 A probationer is
aware that his “activities will be scrutinized.”60 However, a criminal
conviction and probationary sentence does not “eviscerate all of the
defendant’s rights of privacy.”61 Though a probationer has a reduced
privacy interest, this does not “automatically mean a probationer has no
privacy expectations.”62

A. Reasonable Suspicion
The Court must first determine whether reasonable suspicion
justified the probation search. Generally, a search violates the Fourth
Amendment if it is not conducted pursuant to a validly issued warrant
supported by probable cause.63 Under Montana law, a valid search warrant
must state facts showing probable cause made under oath and particular
description of the things to be seized.64 Probable cause exists whether there
is a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and the evidence
sought exists at the designated place.65
The United States and Montana Constitutions draw a firm line at
the entrance to a home.66 A warrantless search inside a home is per se
unreasonable, “subject to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.”67 One such exception is a probation search.68 The
“special needs” of supervision justify a departure from the “usual warrant
and probable cause requirements.”69 A probation officer may conduct a
warrantless search of a probationer’s residence if the officer has
58
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reasonable suspicion of a probation violation.70 The reasonable suspicion
standard is substantially less than the probable cause standard because of
the probationer’s diminished expectation of privacy.71 To require a warrant
for a probation search would “artificially raise a probationer’s privacy
interest to a level inconsistent with conditional liberty status.”72 The Court
will determine whether sufficient grounds existed for reasonable suspicion
by reviewing the totality of the circumstances.73
The Court will likely not dedicate much time during oral argument
discussing whether officers had reasonable suspicion, but rather what
supported their reasonable suspicion. The State argues that Peoples’ past
violations, the nature of his alleged probation violation, and the phone call
from Ms. Peoples justified the probation search.74 However, Peoples does
not dispute that the State had reasonable suspicion, rather, as discussed
below, he disputes the proportionality of the search to the alleged
probation violation—personal drug use and possible overdose.75
Here, the Court will likely find that officers had reasonable
suspicion of a probation violation to justify a warrantless search of
Peoples’ residence. P.O. Stricker received a phone call from Ms. Peoples
where she stated that Peoples was using drugs and may have overdosed.76
She also stated that there was blood in his residence.77 Peoples does not
dispute her credibility because in the past, her reports had often been
confirmed to be true.78 With this report and his past understanding of
Peoples’ addiction issues, P.O. Stricker likely had reasonable suspicion
that Peoples violated a condition of his probation.

B. The Nature of the State’s Intrusion
The heart of oral argument will likely lie in discussing the
relationship between the grounds for reasonable suspicion and the nature
and conduct of the State’s search. This part of the analysis depends upon
what facts supported P.O. Stricker’s reasonable suspicion and how those
facts limit or expand the scope of a reasonable search. The outcome could
further constrict a probationer’s already diminished expectation of privacy
70
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during a probation search. However, the Court will likely hold the search
unconstitutional because the nature of the State’s intrusion was
unreasonable.
A probation officer is in a “far superior” position than a judge to
determine the appropriate degree of supervision because of their
“continued experience with the probationer, knowledge of the original
offense, with the probationer’s welfare in mind.”79 The probation officer
determines the level of supervision “necessary to provide both
rehabilitation of the probationer and safety for society.”80 This special
relationship creates the justification for warrantless probation searches.81
However, there must be a factual foundation justifying a probation search
and the “search should not be used as an instrument of harassment or
intimidation.”82
At oral argument, Peoples will likely argue that the search of his
home was both harassing and intimidating because it was disproportionate
to the suspicion of drug use and possible overdose which initially justified
the search.83 He will likely reiterate that the State’s justification does not
support an intrusion that was pre-planned, approved for forced entry,
supported by a U.S. Marshal, and involved deceiving his landlord for his
apartment key.84
The State will likely counter that P.O. Stricker’s experience and
awareness of Peoples’ conviction history, repeated relapses, and past
noncompliance issues justified his method of entry.85 More specifically,
the State might argue that they were concerned by the report of blood86
and that if Peoples was manufacturing his own meth, it would have created
a dangerous situation.87 Also, once inside Peoples’ residence, officers
conducted a homicide investigation which quickly cleared Peoples.88
Here, the Court will likely agree with Peoples that P.O. Stricker’s
probation search was unreasonable because the suspicion of drug use does
not justify this type of intrusion and the search was harassing and
intimidating. The Court has upheld probation searches as reasonable when
they ripen from a home visit to a search after discovering additional
79

Id. at 19 (quoting State v. Burke, 766 P.2d 254, 256 (Mont. 1988)).
State v. Fischer, 323 P.3d 891, 894 (Mont. 2014).
81
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 19–20.
82
Id. at 18–19 (quoting Burke, 766 P.2d at 256).
83
Id. at 24.
84
Id. at 22.
85
Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 12–13.
86
Id. at 11.
87
Id. at 14–15.
88
Id. at 18.
80

2021

PREVIEW: STATE V. PEOPLES

151

information. In both State v. Fischer89 and State v. Stucker,90 probation
officers requested and received permission to conduct a search of a
probationer’s home after they discovered potential probation violations. In
Fischer, a probation officer first conducted a home visit where Fischer
admitted to multiple violations, which led to a search of her purse.91 The
officer did not immediately conduct a search, rather, he initially requested
to see her pills.92 In Stucker, Stucker consented to a home visit where two
probation officers discovered weapons cases is plain view.93 Officers then
requested Stucker to open the case, which he complied, and officers
discovered a prohibited weapon.94 After discovering the weapon, officers
conducted a search of his home for additional weapons.95
The difference between this case and Fischer and Stucker is that
Peoples did not answer his door.96 Unlike Fischer and Stucker, no
probation officer actually requested permission to conduct a search,
instead they knocked and announced their presence at Peoples’ front door.
After Ms. Peoples’ report, P.O. Stricker did not call Peoples to check on
him or to request a home visit.97 Because the Court has previously relied
upon a probationer’s conditions of release when determining whether a
search has occurred and whether the search was reasonable,98 here
Peoples’ probation conditions will likely guide the Court’s decision. In
relevant part, Peoples’ conditions of release require that “[h]e must submit,
at any time, to a warrantless search of his residence . . . at the reasonable
request of his supervising officer.”99 Since Peoples never answered and
the search was harassing and intimidating, the Court will likely limit this
type of search, holding it unreasonable.
The Court has the opportunity to expand upon the meaning of a
“harassing and intimidating” probation search. The Court has not held a
probation search unconstitutional because it was harassing and
intimidating. P.O. Stricker did not attempt to call Peoples or request a
home visit prior to entry.100 After Peoples was handcuffed, he was left
89
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naked, on the floor, while officers searched his residence.101 P.O. Stricker
testified that Peoples remained “calm and compliant” throughout, even
while he remained naked and handcuffed.102 After about 30 minutes,
another officer arrived and stated that they should put clothes on
Peoples.103 The Court might find these facts persuasive and hold in
Peoples’ favor that the search was both harassing and intimidating.
The Court will likely question the State about P.O. Stricker’s
primary reason for conducting the probation search to determine the
reasonable level of intrusion. The suspicion of blood in Peoples’ residence
triggered Probation and Parole’s request for forced entry permission.104
However, the State asserts that P.O. Stricker’s reason for entering without
Peoples’ permission was “based in part on a report of” blood and a possible
overdose.105 And once inside Peoples’ residence, officers conducted a
homicide investigation.106 However, the State also claims that if Peoples
was operating a clandestine lab, it would have created a dangerous
environment, even though the record does not contain evidence that
Peoples’ apartment was actually contaminated.107 The Court will likely
reject this hypothetical because, as the State admits, the record does not
contain any evidence to suggest that P.O. Stricker believed Peoples was
operating a clandestine lab.
V.

CONCLUSION

Though probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy,
their right to privacy is not extinguished. This case presents an opportunity
for the Court to further clarify the privacy interests of a probationer. The
Court will likely hold that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a
probation search based on Peoples’ past addiction issues and Ms. Peoples’
report of drug use and possible overdose. Additionally, even though
probation officers have discretion to supervise a probationer in a manner
they see fit, that supervision must also be reasonable. The Court will likely
hold the search was unreasonable because P.O. Stricker’s request was not
reasonable, and the search was harassing and intimidating. Thus, the
Montana Supreme Court will likely reverse the district court’s denial of
Peoples’ motion to suppress and remand consistent with its opinion.
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